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FOR EUR/EE AND IO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, YO, US

SUBJECT: YUGOSLAVIA-ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT

REF : 75 STATE 289641

1. U.S. INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

A. YUGOSLAVIA'S POSITION IN THE WORLD AND ITS PURSUIT OF ITS NON-ALIGNED POLICIES PRESENT THE U.S. WITH BOTH ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. THE CHALLENGE OF AMERICAN POLICY IS TO FASHION OUR RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA SO AS TO ENHANCE THOSE ASPECTS OF ITS POLICY WHICH COINCIDE WITH OUR INTERESTS AND ATTEMPT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO DISCOURAGE THOSE ASPECTS OF ITS POLICY WHICH UNDERMINE OUR OBJECTIVES.

SINCE OUR GEOSTRATEGIC RIVALRY WITH THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, YUGOSLAV MILITARY INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IS OUR MOST IMPORTANT INTEREST. (INDEED, THE ABSENCE OF U.S. RIVALRY WITH THE SOVIET

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UNION, YUGOSLAVIA'S IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. WOULD ENORMOUSLY DIMINISH, SINCE UNLIKE WESTERN EUROPE ITS

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL IS RELATIVELY MODEST.) BY MILITARY INDEPENDENCE WE MEAN THE ABSENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS OR BASES ON YUGOSLAV SOIL, PARTICULARLY THE ADRIATIC COAST, THE PRESENCE OF WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY WEAKEN OUR MILITARY POSITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. MOREOVER, A YUGOSLAVIA WHICH IS DE JURE OR DE FACTO PART OF THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ENORMOUSLY THREATEN AUSTRIA, ITALY, GREECE AND TURKEY, AND INDEED, THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO, THUS AFFECTING A WORLDWIDE BALANCE OF POWER.

B. YUGOSLAV INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE EXPRESSED ALSO IN POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL TERMS. ITS SELF-MANAGEMENT COMMUNISM CAN BE CAUTIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS A MORE LIBERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLE ACT AS AN ATTRACTIVE MODEL OR COMMUNIST EVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF. HOWEVER, THIS IS BY NO MEANS ASSURED OR PREDICATABLE. INDEED, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE YUGOSLAV EXAMPLE, WHICH CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF ITS REPUBLICS AND NATIONALITIES, CONSTITUTES A NEGATIVE OBJECT LESSON TO THE SOVIET UNION, SUGGESTING THE DANGERS OF LIBERALIZING ITS SOCIETY. THUS, THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. OF THE UNIQUE SELF-MANAGEMENT TYPE COMMUNISM WHICH HAS EVOLVED IN YUGOSLAVIA LIES IN THE PHILOSOPHIC RATIONALE IT PROVIDES THE YUGOSLAVS FOR THEIR POLICY OF MILITARY INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

IN ANY EVENT, U.S. POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAV SELF-MANAGEMENT OR ITS INDEPENDENT BRAND OF COMMUNISM IS MODERATED BY U.S. IDEOLOGICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC OPPOSITION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES (BELGRADE 1000). IN EUROPE, THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD SEEK TO DIMISH THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AND MARXIST TOTALITARIAN STATES. IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE IN EUROPE TO SHARPEN THE DISTINCTIONS

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BETWEEN ALL DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, REGARDLESS OR THEIR ECONOMIC ORIENTATION, AND MARXIST DICTATORSHIPS.

ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION IT IS CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES OF NATIONALITY, THEREFORE, U.S. SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAV TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY MUST CONTINUE TO BE A CORNERSTONE OF OUR BILATERAL POLICY.

C. YUGOSLAVIA'S NON ALIGNED POLICY, EXCEPT INsofar AS

IT ARGUABLY HELPS PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION, RUNS COUNTER TO U.S. INTERESTS. THE YUGOSLAVS SEEK TO STEER THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD PURSUANT TO THEIR OWN MARXIST COMPASS, AND OF COURSE THIS INEVITABLY CLASHES WITH OUR OWN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NOT OTHER COUNTRY WHICH PLACES MORE STRESS ON DISCIPLINED NON-ALIGNED UNITY, AND THE BLOC NATURE OF THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD AS WE HAVE SEEN, DOES NOT SERVE U.S. INTERESTS. ON SOME NON-ALIGNED ISSUES, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN MODERATING NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS SO AS TO NOT DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH U.S. INTERESTS, AND ON OTHERS THEY HAVE SPEARHEADED DIRECT CLASHES. WITH NEW U.S. AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF A COHERENT WORLDWIDE POLICY DEALING WITH MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES, OUR BILATERAL POLICY WITH YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD FIT CREDIBLY WITH OUR OVERALL POLICY TOWARDS THE DEVELOPING AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS WITHOUT UNDERCUTTING UNIQUELY EUROPEAN GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS.

2. POLICY OBJECTIVES

THEREFORE, OUR POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD PURSUE THREE MAJOR OBJECTIVES. FIRST, ENHANCE ITS GEO-STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION (WHICH REQUIRES YUGOSLAV TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY). SECOND, REDUCE ITS POSSIBILITIES OF BLUNTING WESTERN EUROPEAN WILL TO CONFRONT COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY. THIRD, UNDERMINE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE YUGOSLAV STRATEGIC NON-ALIGNED GOALS AND MODERATE ITS CAPACITY TO CAUSE US DIFFICULTY IN MULTILATERAL FORA IN PURSUIT OF ITS STRATEGIC GOAL.

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3. 1975 IN RETROSPECT

THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HERE IN AUGUST, AND THE MINIC SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GOVE MAJOR

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IMPETUS TO THE FIRST AND THIRD OF OUR OBJECTIVES. THE PRESIDENT'S TALKS IN PARTICULAR EMPHASIZED THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO YUGOSLAVIA'S MILITARY INDEPENDENCE AND PROVIDED THE SIGNAL THE TWO GOVERNMENTS' BUREAUCRACIES NEEDED TO GET THE MILITARY PROGRAM UNDERWAY IN EARNEST. LIKEWISE, THE VISITS OF SPEAKER ALBERT (LAST AUGUST) AND CHAIRMAN MORGAN (EARLY 1976) GAVE US A CHANCE TO REPEATEDLY EXPOSE THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVT NOT ONLY TO OUR COMMITMENT TO THEIR TERRITORIAL INDEPENDENCE, BUT ALSO TO AIR FORCEFULLY SOME OF OUR MAJOR CONCERNS AND COMPLAINTS ON BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES. AT THE EMBASSY WE BEGAN SOME ACTIONS TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR YUGOSLAVIA BLUNTING THE WILL OF WESTERN EUROPE TO CONFRONT COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY. BUT OVERALL THIS OBJECTIVE WAS NOT A FACTOR IN U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS THIS PAST YEAR.

PERHAPS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF OUR ACTIONS DURING THE YEAR IS THAT THE YUGOSLAVS ARE NOW
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SOMEWHAT WORRIED ABOUT THE MULTILATERAL ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONS--AFTER A SERIES OF STRONG DEMARCHES ON MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS, ANGOLA AND LAZLO TOTH, AND AFTER WE HAVE MADE REPEATEDLY CLEAR THAT SUCH GOY ACTIONS WILL AND DO AFFECT OUR RELATIONS.

BUT THE RECORD ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES WAS DISTINCTLY MIXED. ON THE DEBIT SIDE, THE YUGOSLAVS CONTINUED

THEIR DECADE-LONG SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA AND ALLOWED SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS. THE GOY LED THE OPPOSITION TO US AT THE UN ON THE KOREAN RESOLUTIONS AND VOTED FOR THE ZIONISM-IS-RACISM RESOLUTION; CHALLENGED OUR EFFORTS AT THE NPT REVIEW COMMITTEE; AND THREATENED TO RECONSIDER THEIR NUCLEAR POLICIES AND ORGANIZE A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE UNLESS THE NUCLEAR POWERS MENDED THEIR WAYS.

ON THE CREDIT SIDE, YUGOSLAV SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS WAS OCCASIONALLY HELPFUL. YUGOSLAV BACKING WAS IMPORTANT FOR SADAT WHEN HE CAME UNDER FIRE FROM RADICAL ARABS DURING THE SINAI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY YUGOSLAV SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S RECENT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS). THE GOY SHOWED CONSIDERABLE COURAGE IN HEADING OFF THE MOVE AT THE LIMA NON-ALIGNED MEETING TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAEL'S EXPULSION FROM THE UN, A KEY FACTOR IN PREVENTING THE ISSUE FROM COMING TO THE FLOOR OF THE UNGA. YUGOSLAVIA REACTED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY'S ECONOMIC PROPOSAL AT THE GA AND HAS CONTINUED AMONG THE MOST REALISTIC IN ON-GOING WORK ON THE DC-LDC ECONOMIC RELATIONS. FINALLY, BY ABSTAINING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON A PUERTO RICO RESOLUTION, YUGOSLAVIA DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY THAT IT WILL ON OCCASION TAKE OUR INTERESTS INTO CONSIDERATION IF WE FIGHT HARD ENOUGH (AND EARLY ENOUGH) FOR THEM.

TWO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WERE USEFUL TO US. THE ARRESTS OF AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN YUGOSLAVIA AGAINST PRO-SOVIET COMINFORMISTS REMINDED THE WORLD OF CONTINUED SOVIET MEDDLING. DESPITE THE SOOTHING NOISES OF THE "PRAVDA" ARTICLE AND
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MINIC-GROMYKO COMMUNIQUE, THE YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THE NEED TO KEEP DEFENSES UP. IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE, AND AS EVIDENCED BY DOLANC AT THE CPSU JAMBOREE, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE LED A GROWING RESISTANCE TO SOVIET CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT. (BUT THIS IS A TWO-EDGED SWORD FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT, HELPING TO LEGITIMIZE AND STRENGTHEN WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES EVEN AS IT ENCOURAGES THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW.)

OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS CONTINUED TO DEVELOP STEADILY, THOUGH AT A REDUCED PACE BECAUSE CONSTRAINTS ON EXIM AND A GREATER DEGREE OF CAUTION ON THE PART OF SOME U.S. BANKS TOWARDS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASING THEIR EXPOSURE. U.S. TRADE

AND INVESTMENT INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA ARE FAR FROM BEING DECISIVE VARIABLES IN INFLUENCING THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY. THE FACTS OF LIFE ARE THAT YUGOSLAVIA'S NATURAL WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN (AMONG THE LATTER PARTICULARLY THE SOVIETS) PARTNERS ARE DOMINANT. BUT THE LEADERSHIP ROLE THE U.S. ECONOMY PLAYS GLOBALLY, AND THE ADVANCED NATURE OF OUR TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES, AND THE SCOPE OF OUR CAPITAL MARKETS, GIVES US A PERCEPTUAL BOOST TO A POSITION UNWARRANTED BY THE COLD STATISTICS ALONE. THIS UNDENIABLY GIVES US A DEGREE OF ECONOMIC LEVERAGE, AND IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT IN A YEAR WHEN SENIOR YUGOSLAVS AND THE YUGOSLAV MEDIA KEPT UP A STEADY ASSAULT ON YUGOSLAVIA'S ALLEGEDLY SHABBY COMMERCIAL TREATMENT AT THE HANDS OF WESTERN EUROPE (PARTICULARLY THE IC) AND JAPAN, ON THIS SUBJECT AT LEAST THE UNITED STATES WAS TREATED WITH KID GLOVES.

THERE CONTINUES TO BE STRONG INTEREST BY U.S. BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL CIRCLES IN YUGOSLAVIA AS A SITE FOR EQUITY INVESTMENTS. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE EQUALLY KEEN TO HAVE U.S. COMPANIES AS PARTNERS IN THIRD COUNTRY MARKETS; PARTICULARLY THIRD WORLD NATIONS WHERE YUGOSLAVIA'S MAJOR TROVE OF POLITICAL CAPITAL IS INVESTED. USG PROMOTIONAL EFFORTS, THE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF EXIM BANK, AND OPIC PROGRAMS WERE
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SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS IN STIMULATING THIS INTEREST, AS WAS THPMQIWWATELY SPONSORED U.S.-YUGOSLAV COUNCIL.

THERE WERE SOME NOTABLE HIGHLIGHTS. TO SINGLE OUT POSSIBLY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT: DOW CHEMICAL

SIGNED A LETTER OF INTENT AND AT THIS WRITING HAS NEARLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE YUGOSLAV FIRM INA ON A MAJOR JOINT VENTURE IN PETROCHEMICALS, INVOLVING A TOTAL INVESTMENT OF WELL OVER \$500 MILLION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE FACT THAT EXIM'S OWN CONSTRAINTS AND ITS ALREADY HEAVY COMMITMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA RULED OUT ANYTHING BEYOND A MODEST GROWTH IN EXPOSURE HERE IS PROBABLY ON BALANCE A PLUS--POLITICALLY AND TACTICALLY--LEADING YUGOSLAVS TO ASK WHETHER

BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE AFFECTED BY THEIR VOTES AT
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UNITED NATIONS*

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IN THE AREAS OF CONSULAR RELATIONS AND YUGOSLAV
EMIGRE ACTIVITY WE HAVE AT LEAST SUCCEEDED IN LETTING
THE YUGOSLAVS KNOW THE U.S. IS AS CONCERNED ABOUT OUR
CITIZENS WELFARE HERE AS YUGOSLAVS ARE ABOUT EMIGRE
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES. BUT BEYOND THAT IT WAS
A BLEAK YEAR. THE TOTH CASE DEMONSTRATED IN BRUTAL
FASHION THE DIFFICULTY OF PROTECTING DUAL NATIONALS
AND THE STARK DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YUGOSLAV AND
AMERICAN CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE. TERRORIST ACTS BY EMIGRE
ORGANIZATIONS--SUCH AS THE BOMBING IN NEW YORK AND
CHICAGO AND THE ATTACK ON THE WIFE OF THE YUGOSLAV
CONGEN IN NEW YORK--CONTINUED TO FUEL SUSPICIONS ABOUT
OFFICIAL UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR EMIGRE SUBVERSION
IN THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF OUR RELATIONSHIP NOT A SINGLE
TERRORIST HAS BEEN APPREHENDED. THIS IS A SORRY RECORD.
WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO CHANGE IT.

IN OUR INFORMATION AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES WE HAVE
BROUGHT ABOUT A SHIFT IN PRIORITIES TO GET OUR
FOREIGN POLICY VIEW POINT ACROSS FORCEFULLY AND TO
FOCUS ON THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF YUGOSLAV
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SOCIETY. AND WE HAVE BROUGHT OUR REGIONAL INFORMATION CENTERS FULLY IN THE POLICY DISSEMINATION PORCESS AND ARE PLACING HEAVY EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL SCIENTISTS, HISTORIANS AND ECONOMISTS IN OUR SPEAKERS' PROGRAM.

IN THE AREA OF THE MEDIA WE HAVE REACTED STRONGLY TO ANTI-AMERICAN DISINFORMATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE PRESS, WITH PERSONAL VISITS BY SENIOR USIS OFFICERS TO THE OFFENDING EDITORS AND COMMENTATORS, AS WELL AS TO THE COMPETENT MINISTERS. WHILE THESE MINI-DEMARCHES HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN ELIMINATING THE YUGOSLAV MEDIA'S TENDENCY TO DISTORT AND MINISFORM, THEY HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT AN AWARENESS THAT THE AMERICANS EXPECT THE YUGOSLAV MEDIA TO REFLECT YUGOSLAV POLICY AS IT IS EXPRESSED OPENLY TO OUR DIPLOMATS. FURTHERMORE, INFORMATION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN ALIGNED ON FOREIGN POLICY LINES WITH EMPHASIS ON BRINGING ABOUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. OBJECTIVES IN CSCE "THIRD BASKET" MATTERS.

4. POLICY AGENDA

OUR MAJOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS PARALLEL OUR THREE MAJOR OBJECTIVES.

A. ENHANCE YUGOSLAVIA'S GEOSTRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION:

AS WE MOVE TOWARDS THE POST TITO ERA IT IS CLEAR THAT TWO INSTITUTION MORE THAN ANY OTHERS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER YUGOSLAVIA REMAINS INDEPENDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION--THE JNA AND THE PARTY. THE MILITARY IS MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUR DIRECT ACTIONS, BUT WE MUST STRENGTHEN OUR TIES WITH BOTH.

MILITARY COOPERATION. THE ELLSWORTH VISIT IN NOVEMBER 1974 WAS THE BEGINNING OF A MAJOR POLICY CHANGE REGARDING THE SALE OF ARMS TO YUGOSLAVIA. THE RESULTING "LIST" OF MILITARY HARDWARE, PRIMARILY AIR FORCE ITEMS, PROVIDED AN EXCEPTIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACT THAT IS STILL CONTINUING. WITH THIS LIST, THE TOW BREAKTHROUGH, AND THE UPCOMING SARATOGA VISIT, WE HAVE RECORDED THE MOST CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD A DURABLE, MEANINGFUL

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MILITARY RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE END OF THE MAAG. NOW THE CHALLENGE IS TO SUSTAIN THIS MOMENTUM WITH INCREASED

SALES, HIGH-RANKING MILITARY EXCHANGES AND INCREASED TRAINING EXPOSURE. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE INDICATED A DESIRE, WITHIN DEFINITE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PARAMETERS, TO REDUCE THEIR RELIANCE ON THE SOVIETS FOR SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT. OUR RESPONSES TO THEIR SHOPPING LISTS TO DATE HAVE EXCLUDED SUCH ITEMS. TOW WILL HELP BUT THERE IS CONTINUING SUSPICION AS TO WHETHER WE ARE SINCERE ABOUT OUR EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR INDEPENDENCE. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT, AT A MINIMUM WE AGREE TO SELL TO THE GOY ANY EQUIPMENT WHICH, AFTER VIETNAM OR IN OTHER WAYS, WE KNOW THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCESS TO. WE SAY THIS NOT BECAUSE THE GOY WOULD INTENTIONALLY PASS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE SOVIETS BUT BECAUSE THAT POLICY WOULD SOFTEN THE DISCLOSURE ISSUE.

A CAUTIONARY NOTE, HOWEVER, ON TOW. BECAUSE OF THE PRESS SPECULATION ON OUR OFFER, WHICH HAS PUBLICLY COASTED THE WEAPON WITH ANTI-SOVIET VARNISH AND PROMPTED TITO TO COMMENT NEGATIVELY TO CODEL ALBERT ON THE YUGOSLAV NEED FOR ANTI-TANK MISSILES, THERE IS SOME LIKELIHOOD THAT THE YUGOSLAVS MAY NOT PICK UP TOW. OR THEY MAY DELAY THEIR TENDER. WHAT THE GOY DOES WITH OUR TOW OFFER SHOULD NOT ALTER THE PREMISES OF OUR SALES POLICY: ESPECIALLY SINCE U.S. POLICY HAS A DEFINITE DERIVATIVE IMPACT IN MAKING IT EASIER FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS (E.G., FRANCE) TO OPEN THEIR OWN PROGRAMS OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY SUPPLY.

--THE PARTY. WE ARE BEGINNING TO GET TO KNOW TITO'S POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS BETTER BUT WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO. IN RECENT MONTHS THE AMBASSADOR HAS SEEN KARDELJ, DLANC, BELIC, GRILIKOV AND REGIONAL PARTY LEADERS, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS THE PARTY HAS ALLOWED A REGULAR CONTACT AT THE NEXT LEVEL DOWN. THE DIALOGUE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY STRENGTHENED BY VISITS OF KARDELJ AND THEN DOWCNC TO THE UNITED STATES. BOTH MEN ARE TRAVELING TO OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND, OF COURSE, THE SOVIETS ARE PERSISTENT IN THEIR
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ATTENTIONS. A KARDELJ VISIT TO THE U.S. IS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP TO PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT HERE. IT IS TIME WE WORKED ON THIS HIGH PRIORITY ITEM.

B. INFLUENCING YUGOSLAV-EUROPEAN RELATIONS:
THE TRICK FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD WEST EUROPEAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS IS TO SIMULTEOUSLY DO WHAT WE CAN TO STRENGTHEN EUROPE'S SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAVIA'S MILITARY INDEPENDENCE AND WEAKEN THE IMAGE OF

YUGOSLAVIA AS A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MODEL TO BE
EMULATED.

ON THE ONE HAND, WE CONTINUALLY WORRY ABOUT
THE PROBLEMS OF A POST-TITO SUCCESSION CRISIS. PROBABLY
SO. WE CAN AND SHOULD DO MORE TO CONSULT

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SERIOUSLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY WITH WESTERN EUROPE
ON THIS ISSUE. BEYOND DIPLOMACY, THERE IS A DOMESTIC
POLITICAL REASON FOR THIS. ONE LESSON OF THE U.S.
ANGOLA EXPERIENCE IS THAT U.S. POLICIES ON ISSUES
INVOLVING MILITARY OR QUASI-MILITARY RISK THAT RECEIVE
LITTLE OR LUKEWARM PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM OUR MAJOR
ALLIES ARE SEVERELY LIMITED. OBVIOUSLY, THERE ARE
IMPLICATIONS IN THIS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD POST-TITO
YUGOSLAVIA.

THEREFORE WE RECOMMEND:

(1) INITIATING CLOSER CONTACT WITH OUR NATO
COLLEAGUES BOTH IN BELGRADE, IN THEIR CAPITALS AND
AT NATO HEADQUARTERS. THIS PROCESS MUST NOT BE OVER-

PLAYED, BUT ALL OF US ARE RIGHTLY CONCERNED WITH THE
POSSIBILITIES OF POST-TITO PROBLEMS AND WE MUST COME TO
GRIPS WITH THEM.

(2) INDICATING TO BOTH YUGOSLAVS AND EUROPEANS
THAT WE CONSIDER ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES BETWEEN
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THEM FINGIBLE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS, AND ARE WILLING
TO SUPPORT YUGOSLAVIA IN EFFORTS TO BUILD A STRONGER
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL POSTURE VIS-A-VIS WESTERN
EUROPE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, NOW THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN
CP'S ARE ATTEMPTING TO GAIN POWER VIA A NEW IMAGE,
WE BELIEVE THE NOTION THAT YUGOSLAVIA DEMONSTRATES
COMMUNISM CAN BE DEMOCRATIC AND HUMANE IS INCREASINGLY
DANGEROUS (AS SUGGESTED IN BELGRADE 1000). OVERALL, WE
SHOULD BEGIN TO PULL TOGETHER GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC
FORCES FROM BOTH THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT BEHIND A
RENEWED AWARENESS OF THE VALUES WE ARE FOR, NOT JUST
WHAT WE ARE AGAINST; BEHIND THE SENSE OF CONFIDENCE
THAT WILL EMERGE ONCE WE CONVINCE OURSELVES THAT WE
ARE THE FUTURE AND THAT DICTATORSHIPS--COMMUNIST AS
WELL AS FACIST--ARE OF THE PAST. SIMPLE ANTI-COMMUNISM
IS NOT ENOUGH. WESTERN EUROPEANS, AS EXPERIENCE WITH
CSCE BASKET THREE INDICATES, ARE AWARE OF THE POWER
OF THESE IDEAS AND MORE WILLING TO USE THEM THAN THE
U.S. THE EMERGENCE OF THREE NEW EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES
(GREECE, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL) SHOULD GIVE THIS DRIVE
ENORMOUS STRENGTH. THE KEY IS TO FOCUS ON DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS, ON FREE ELECTIONS AND FREE PRESS. THE
SOVIETS ARE ALREADY ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THIS AREA. WE
CANNOT IGNORE YUGOSLAVIA, ALONG WITH THE CP'S OF
WESTERN EUROPE, AS TARGETS.

C. MODERATE MULTILATERAL IMPACT OF YUGOSLAVIA:
THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WANT
TO RIGOROUSLY COMPARTMENTALIZE BILATERAL AND MULTI-
LATERAL RELATIONS. SEVERAL TIMES THIS YEAR WE HAVE
INDICATED OUR CONTRARY VIEW. STILL, AS 1976 MOVES ALONG,
THE YUGOSLAVS BETRAY A BELIEF OR HOPE THAT WE DO NOT
MEAN IT. THE MOYNIHAN AFFAIR HAS NOT HELPED. YUGOSLAV
COMMENT HAS GENERALLY TRIED TO PORTRAY THE MOYNIHAN
DEMOUMENT AS A CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN STYLE--
ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE COMMENT LONG AND LOUD (NEGATIVELY)
ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S MULTI-
LATERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE. WE MUST ALLOW THEM NO
OPPORTUNITY FOR DOUBTS ABOUT LACK OF U.S. SERIOUSNESS
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IN LOOKING AFTER OUR MULTILATERAL INTERESTS. THIS IS ALL THE MORE SO SINCE WE HAVE GONE ON RECORD IN BELGRADE WITH AN EXCEPTIONALLY SHARP DEMARCHE ON ANGOLA WHEREIN WE (AGAIN) SAID YUGOSLAV POLICIES AND ACTIONS WILL AFFECT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. OUR CREDIBILITY IS AT ISSUE.

AT THE LEAST, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A LEAF FROM MINIC'S OWN BOOK, ALONG THE LINES OF HIS FEBRUARY ADDRESS THIS YEAR TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SAWPY FEDERAL CONFERENCE" ...IT WOULD BE MISTAKEN TO BELIEVE THAT COOPERATION EXCLUDES CONFRONTATION. NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT ARE MADE UP OF COMMON INTERESTS BUT ALSO CONFRONTATION AND THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE WITH OPPOSING INTERESTS".

WHEN THE YUGOSLAVS TAKE POSITIONS OR ACTIONS ON THE MULTILATERAL PLANE THAT WE FIND UNDESIRABLE (OR DOWNRIGHT HOSTILE), WE SHOULD BOTH BE IN A POSITION TO SELECT ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WHERE YUGOSLAVIA IS PRIME BENEFICIARY AND THEN BE WILLING TO USE THEM AS LEVERAGE. THERE IS ONLY ONE SEGMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WE SHOULD REMOVE FROM THIS CONSTRUCT--THE MILITARY, FOR REASONS CITED EARLIER. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES INTO THINKING (OR ACTING) AS IF THE REMAINDER OF BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE UP FOR GRABS. WE DO HAVE PRIORITY LEVELS OF INTEREST AND OBJECTIVES, AND OUR SEARCH FOR LEVERAGE MUST BE SO CONDITIONED. WHAT FOLLOWS IS A FRAMEWORK WE RECOMMEND FOR CONSIDERATION.

YUGOSLAVIA IS FAR MORE SENSITIVE AND VULNERABLE TO SEMANTICS AND ATMOSPHERICS THAN IS THE U.S. AT THE HIGH END OF THE RANGE OF POTENTIAL RESPONSES WE RECOMMEND CONSIDERING:

(1) ON OCCASION DROPPING REFERENCE TO YUGOSLAVIA'S "NON-ALIGNED POLICY", "NON-ALIGNED YUGOSLAVIA" AND THE LIKE FROM OFFICIAL JOINT COMMUNIQUEES AND DECLARATIONS.

(2) INDICATING A LACK OF INTEREST IN SPONSORING

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NON-DEFENSE CABINET-LEVEL AND IMPORTANT
SUB-CABINET -LEVEL OFFICIAL VISITS. DISCOURAGE

CONGRESSIONAL VISITS, AND IF THEY TAKE PLACE,
BRIEF INCOMING LEGISLATORS TO KEEP PRESSURE ON
THEIR YUGOSLAV COUNTERPARTS. (THE KARDELJ
VISIT SHOULD BE EXCEPTED BECAUSE OF HIS ROLE IN
A SUCCESSION SCENARIO; BUT THOUGHT SHOULD BE
GIVEN NOW TO THE ADVISABILITY OF THE PROPOSED
TRIP TO BELGRADE OF SECRETARY SIMON.)

IN A SECON ORDER OF PRIORITY, WE RECOMMEND MAKING
A PERCEPTUAL (AND PERCEPTIBLE) SHIFT ICOUR ATTITUDE
TOWARD BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, HENCEFORTH
CONSIDERING THEM STRICTLY FOR THEIR ECONOMIC MERITS
UTONE THIS IS ADMITTEDLY TRICKY. IT IS MOSTLY AN
ATTITUDINAL SHIFT, INVOLVING NOT SO MUCH DELIBERATELY
LOOKING FOR WAYS TO BE NEGATIVE IN ECONOMIC AND

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ACTION EUR-12

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NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00

PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01 ACDA-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 SAM-01

SAJ-01 AID-05 SCA-01 XMB-02 COME-00 /092 W

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INFO AMCONSUL ZAGREB

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COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AS IT IMPLIES A DISINCLINATION
TO BE ENTHAUSIASTIC ABOUT THE POLITICAL DESIRABILTY AND
BENEFITS OF THESE RELATIONS. BUT AT LEAST IN ONE CORNER
OF OUR ECONOMIC TIES, THAT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
THIS SHIFT COULD IMMEDIATELY AND CONCRETELY TAKE
PLACE. THE JOINT S&T PROGRAM CLEARLY FAVORS THE

YUGOSLAVS MORE THAN IT DOES THE U.S. HERE WE WOULD
RECOMMEND:

(1) LETTING THE YUGOSLAVS KNOW IN A VERY INDIRECT
WAY THAT FUTURE DECISIONS OF ANY CONSEQUENCE
ON THE JOINT PROGRAM MUST BE RATIFIED BY
VARIOUS PARTS OF THE STATE DEPT AND THAT
NON-BILATERAL CRITERIA ARE INVOLVED. IF THE
DEPARTMENT'S MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE
FINDS IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO OPENLY USE THIS
LIMITED LEVER IN DELAYING DECISIONS ON THE
PROGRAM, WE WOULD NOT OBJECT.

(2) CEASE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO CONTINUE FUNDING
THE JOINT PROGRAM AFTER THE PRESENT LEVEL OF
PIPELINE FUNDING IS EXHAUSTED.

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AT A THIRD LEVEL, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ASPECTS OF
OUR COMMERCIAL PROGRAM AND THE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL
LEVERAGE THAT EXIM FINANCING AFFORDS. HERE THERE
ARE TWO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION:

(1) MAINTAIN A POLITE BUT OFFICIALLY RESERVED
POSITION WITH YUGOSLAVS TOWARD JOINT VENTURE
COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. FIRMS AND YUGOSLAV
ENTERPRISES IN LDC MARKETS, LETTING IT BE
KNOWN THAT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS MUST
PROCEED IN AN ATMOSPHERE AND UNDER CONDITIONS
ACCEPTABLE TO THE TRANSFEREE. WITH U.S.
COMPANIES OUR POSTURE WOULD BE SOMEWHAT
DIFFERENT, OR AT LEAST DIFFERENTLY EXPRESSED.
WE WOULD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT WE WILL SUPPORT
THIRD - COUNTRY JOINT VENTURES ONLY WHEN IN
THE U.S. COMPANY'S CALCULATIONS THERE IS A
COMPARATIVE BUSINESS ADVANTAGE IN HAVING A
YUGOSLAV PARTNER.

(2) ADOPT A POSITION TOWARD EXIM REQUESTS THAT
MAXIMIZED THE CRITERION OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT
TO U.S. COMMERCIAL ENTITIES AND LOWERS THE
OFTEN-IMPUTED POLITICAL CRITERION OF BENEFIT
TO YUGOSLAV STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT. THIS
WILL, IF EXERCISED IN PRACTICE, MEAN MORE
OFTEN EXPRESSED "NO POSITION" FROM THE EMBASSY
ON YUGOSLAV REQUEST FOR EXIM FINANCING, BUT
WILL NOT MEAN WE ARE INDIFFERENT TO THE
COMMERCIAL BENEFITS SOUGHT BY U.S. COMPANIES.

CONSULAR RELATIONS. AS THE OTHER CASE MAKES

CLEAR, WE NEED TO TAKE ACTION ON THE PROBLEM OF DUAL NATIONALS. DESPITE LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECENT YEARS, WE SHOULD AGAIN ATTEMPT TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS LOOKING TOWARD PREPARATION OF NEW CONSULAR CONVENTION OR A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT ON DUAL NATIONALS ALONE. AND THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY ISSUE A PUBLIC WARNING TO DUAL NATIONALS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES THEY MAY FACE SHOULD THEY RETURN TO YUGOSLAVIA.

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EMIGRE ACTIVITIES. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, AS THE TITO SUCCESSION NEARS THE AMOUNT OF EMIGRE TERRORISM IN THE U.S. IS LIKELY TO INCREASE. OUR RECORD THUS FAR IS HARD TO EXPLAIN.

USIS PROGRAM THE YUGOSLAVS PUBLICLY PLACE GREAT STORE IN THE HELSINKI SPIRIT AND CSCE ACCORDS. WE SHALL PLAY ON THOSE THEMES AND FLAG THEIR ATTENTION WHEN THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND HUMANITARIAN CONTACTS ARE INTERRUPTED. THIS ALSO MEANS A HEIGHTENED VIGILANCE AGAINST DISTORTION AND MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE U.S. IN YUGOSLAV PRESS.

IN EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE, WE HAVE STRONGLY PRESSED THE POSITION THAT THE BALANCE IN THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM MUST BE REDRESSED BETWEEN THE "HARD" AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PLAN TO ENSURE THAT THE GOALS SET FOR THE PROGRAM ARE INDEED CARRIED OUT. OTHERWISE, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR WE WILL FUND THE PROGRAM ONLY TO THE NUMERICAL LIMIT IT IS STRICTLY BALANCED. WITH INCREASED ACCESS TO HIGHER PARTY/GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PROMISING YOUNGER LEADERS, WE EXPECT TO GET A GREATER NUMBER OF THESE DECISION MAKERS TO THE U.S. UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM. MULTI-NATIONAL PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY IN FIELDS RELATED TO ECONOMICS, ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. HOWEVER, IN ORDER THAT THE INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM FULLY SATISFY COUNTRY-WIDE GOALS, WE STRONGLY ARGUE THAT A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN FUNDING IS NECESSARY.

ZAGREB FAIR. FOLLOWING THE RELINQUISHMENT OF ITS PAVILLION AT THE END OF 1977, USIA SHOULD CONTINUE WITH ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE FAIR, BUT AT A MORE MODEST LEVEL, AND WITH INCREASED DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SUPPORT WHEN COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES ARE ATTRACTIVE. MOREOVER, USIS EXHIBITS FABRICATED FOR THE ZAGREB FAIR SHOULD BE UTILIZED IN TWO TO THREE OTHER YUGOSLAV CITIES IN THE YEAR FOLLOWING EACH ZAGREB FAIR CLOSING.

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